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Foucault, Simon Springer, and Postneoliberalism
Introduction
When Michel Foucault spoke of neoliberalism in his 1978-79 Biopolitics lectures at the
Collège de France; he did so with the express purpose of investigating a genealogy of calculation
dependent governmental tactics and practices that seek to emphasize the market, human capital,
and economic statistical analysis as the key truth makers in sociopolitical institutions. The term
“neoliberalism”, once limited to the vernacular of international relations and the economics of
the Austrian School, had thus expanded its grid of philosophical applicability to practices of
political power and social discourse1. Yet the past several years have seen a number of thinkers
contend that the hegemony of neoliberalism is waning – that it is giving way to
postneoliberalism2. The arguments for neoliberalism’s ‘end’ have typically found their context in
the interstices of the protests and social movements in the United States post the 2008 Wall
Street crash, mortgage crisis, and subsequent bankruptcy and bailout actions. On the global level
these same arguments occasionally cite a weakening in neoliberal power via new political
policies in Latin America and South East Asia.
Simon Springer has been one of the few to challenge contemporary postneoliberal
theorization from a Foucauldian perspective. In his recent article “Postneoliberalism?” (2014),
Springer argues against the inchoate theoretical underpinnings of those currently postulating an
end to neoliberal power dynamics3. Springer’s nuanced criticism also serves as an attack on the
empirical claims of those thinkers who, as evidence of the decline of neoliberalism and rise of
postneoliberalism, point to the recent 2008 financial crisis, increased police brutality against
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Humphreys, David. "Discourse as Ideology: Neoliberalism and the Limits of International Forest Policy." (2009) p.
320-321; Mccarthy, James, and Scott Prudham. "Neoliberal Nature and the Nature of Neoliberalism." (2004) p. 276277.
2
Ettlinger, Nancy, and Christopher D. Hartmann. "Post/neo/liberalism in Relational Perspective." (2015); Peck, et
al. "Postneoliberalism and Its Malcontents." (2010).
3
Springer situates this argument and most of his previous critiques against neoliberalism in Foucauldian terms and
using a largely Foucauldian method. See Springer (2010a) and (2012).

protestors, resistance to corporate favoritism, and derision expressed toward economic
imperialism. Springer contends that these sorts of postneoliberal assertions are levied against
neoliberalism as if, as a noun, “neoliberalism” represents a static and monolithic set of
conditions, institutions, and policies. This approach - resonant of early Foucauldian writings on
the morphology of discursive practices4 and the indispensable nature of verbs in discourse5 - is
one in which Springer attempts to shift the static elements of “neoliberalism” as a noun to the
verb “neoliberalization”. The result is an attempt to bring postneoliberalism back into the
Foucauldian fold as a dynamic set of relational practices within neoliberal discourse. In
Springer’s estimate, this move renders semantic distinctions between neoliberalism and
postneoliberalism superfluous; which allows for cohesive theories of evaluation and resistance of
neoliberalism to be formulated without the baggage of postneoliberal theorization.
I do not disagree with Springer’s methodology or archeology of post/neoliberalism, as it
appears to be a functional mimesis of Foucault’s analysis of governmentality offered in his
Collège de France lectures between 1977 and 1979. However, I do believe that Springer’s
ontological conclusions regarding neoliberalism and the set of possible conditions under which
he supposes we can find space for political emancipation within it, fall short of a true
Foucauldian account of the power of neoliberal governmentality. It is couched within this
characterization of neoliberalism that Springer fails to grasp the true force and adaptability of
neoliberalism as postneoliberalism. What Foucault’s ontology of neoliberalism offers, contrary
to Springer’s, is a more nuanced and systematically more pervasive socio-political condition in
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Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) Specifically Chapters 1 & 3; Foucault,
Michel. Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (1977) p. 199-201.
5
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1971) p. 92-96

which the spaces for political emancipation are sufficiently beyond the scope of Springer’s
discursive solution.
I will begin with an analysis of Springer’s concept of neoliberalism and
postneoliberalism; specifically where he sees problems in contemporary neoliberal scholarship,
his own understanding of neoliberalism/ization, and how the ‘post-’ distinction becomes virtually
meaningless if a more complex understanding of emancipatory practices is postulated. What will
follow will be a brief account of what I see as the stronger Foucauldian position on neoliberalism
and then a combined retracing of Springer’s argument via Foucault’s. This line of analysis will
continue by exploring the deficiencies of Springer’s understanding of political emancipation and
resistance and how they are overtaken by the stronger Foucauldian characterization of neoliberal
power. From there I will seek to show where Springer’s arguments falter in the face of his own
underestimation of neoliberalism. Finally I will conclude with several brief closing remarks on a
curious and perhaps unintentional strength in Springer’s argument, along with a brief remark on
the developing research into Foucauldian counter-conducts and there potential use in the broader
scheme of post/neoliberal discourse.

Springer’s Post/Neoliberalism
In two articles prior to “Postneoliberalism?” Springer considers the origins and structure
of his concept of neoliberalism/ization6 and argues that modern scholarship on the power of
neoliberalism has focused on a treatment of “neoliberalism as monolithism” – that is to say it is
treated as a single entity with static characteristics that can be avoided, subverted, moved
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Springer (2010a), (2010b).

beyond, etc.7 Springer argues that the tendency of authors on the subject is to relegate
neoliberalism to four camps: (1) Neoliberalism as Ideological Hegemonic Project (2)
Neoliberalism as Policy and Program (3) Neoliberalism as Governmentality and (4)
Neoliberalism as State Form8. While Springer notes that authors tend to interconnect these four
points in various ways, they are still treated in relatively discreet terms so as to render the
theoretical implications and structures of neoliberalism isolated to the specific writers’ treatment
of the subject. The result of this style of treatment leads Springer to conclude that “each
interpretation of neoliberalism does not exist in isolation”9. Neoliberalism thus, traditionally,
consists of subject matter that varies by scholar, time, place, and underlying ideological
commitments. Yet, for Springer, an analysis of neoliberalizing practices should rely on the ever
shifting interplay between these four areas.
This shifting interplay or converse approach to neoliberalism, as opposed to discreet or
monolithic interpretations, should best be conceived of as a type of discourse10. In order to
facilitate this approach, the noun neoliberalism should instead be transfigured into
neoliberalization as a verb. Springer supposes this more accurately depicts neoliberalism as a
concatenation of shifting practices which mutate and hybridize in accordance with the discursive
backdrop from which the term is deployed. “Neoliberalizing practices are thus understood as
necessarily and always overdetermined, contingent, polymorphic, open to intervention… subject
to counter tendencies, and in a perpetual process of becoming.”11 Once we have adopted this

This is also made explicit in Springer’s "Neoliberalism as Discourse: Between Foucauldian Political Economy and
Marxian Poststructuralism." (2012) p. 135-136
8
Ibid. p. 136-139, An extensive analysis of these four areas in beyond the scope of the paper – for the comparative
piece by which Springer constructs his evaluation see Ward & England (2007).
9
Springer (2012) p. 137
10
Ibid p. 139; Springer (2014) p. 6
11
Springer (2014) p. 7
7

dynamic understanding of “neoliberalism”12 we can assess the procedures and characteristics it
takes on through the polysemy it produces. In approaching neoliberalism as a discourse we no
longer see it as a discreet concept which projects specific ends and limitations. At the same time,
this approach gives us a target in which neoliberalizing practices can be contended with and
emancipated from at a chokepoint in the process of discourse production13.
Postneoliberal scholarship has tended, according to Springer, to focus less on the process
and more so on the institutional features by which neoliberalism can be resisted against
“externally”. Meaning that a crisis or collapse of the variety encountered in the 2008 sub-prime
mortgage and financial crisis in the United States would suggest that neoliberalism has weakened
to such an extent that ‘to resist’ would be to assess the failures in market procedures and/or
breakdowns in governmental institutions and suggest alternatives accordingly14. This style of
treatment is tantamount to labelling neoliberalism as an ideology of tenets - which can be
theoretically contradicted - or a set of policies which can be redacted, eliminated, or reconceived.
Springer’s assessment of the scholarship is quite accurate – Peck, et al. see neoliberalism’s death
as coming about through a resistance to globalizing effects of social and political policy15 while
Radcliffe has identified posteneoliberalism with a “shift in development thinking and delivery to
stress a rights-based articulation of individual capacities and wellbeing, nature, and resource
distribution”16. In conceiving of neoliberalism in these terms, postneoliberal scholarship has
tended to place discreet origins, aims, and conclusions on neoliberalizing practices. More

Springer (2010a), (2010b), (2011), (2012), (2014) continues to use the term “neoliberalism” after introducing the
concept of neoliberalization. This is presumably done for the ease of the reader and so as to view neoliberalism as a
type of multifaceted noun that symbolizes a set of discourses between neoliberalizing practices. Springer briefly
laments that “our language and writing has not caught up” to this type of conceptual analysis of terms (2014, p. 7).
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Springer (2012) p. 143; Springer (2014) p. 7
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Springer (2014) p.7-9
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Peck, et al. (2010) p. 96-99
16
Radcliffe, Sarah A. "Development for a Postneoliberal Era? Sumak Kawsay, Living Well and the Limits to
Decolonisation in Ecuador." (2012): p. 240
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importantly, thinking about neoliberalism ideologically has allowed the scholarship to conceive
of a ‘post-’ that can be applied to neoliberalism in the first place. For Springer, this type of
scholarship underestimates the power of neoliberalism and prematurely looks for a way out of its
hegemonic potential without giving adequate consideration to its complex dynamism and
adaptability.
The next step in Springer’s approach to an ‘end of neoliberalism’ qua postneoliberalism
is to draw on the work of Brand & Sekler (2009), and Hendrikse & Sidaway (2010); in the claim
that postneoliberalism is a neoliberalism reacting to crises – neoliberalism as a verb which
denotes a set of practices is “invariably already… beyond itself.”17 To explain this, Springer
delves into an adaptive process called neoliberal “roll-outs”; in which neoliberalism experiences
crises and either finds a solution with what it has at its disposal or undergoes a mutation of its
internal socioeconomic practices so as to render a crisis productive18. This idea of
postneoliberalism as ‘neoliberalism in reaction to x’ ends up being a superfluous contention for
Springer as neoliberalism, once divorced from a possible static conception, is always ‘in
reaction’ to some shifting notion of policy, conduct, practice, etc. Hendrikse & Sidway note that
this is the tendency of market neoliberalism as a whole; to atomize individuals while at the same
time constructing complex relational pathways between participants which may have
contradicting strategies19. Thus market strategies can be identified as an ambulatory series of
reactions to various conditions and alliances between or against other participants in the market.
Building off of this concept of market reactions – and I believe this is Springer’s point as well –
neoliberalism has no specific “end” to achieve or “beginning” to necessarily refer back to. We
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Ibid. p. 9
Ibid. p. 8; for more on neoliberal “roll-outs” also see McCarthy & Prudham (2004)
19
Hendrikse & Sidway (2010) p. 2038-2039
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cannot say, for instance, that neoliberalism began when governmental policy y was adopted or
will necessarily end when market relation z concludes.
What is at stake in Springer’s analysis is a normative assessment of neoliberalism and the
potential for political emancipation. As has been repeatedly mentioned: postneoliberal
scholarship has failed to account for the dynamic and expansive typography of neoliberalizations
and, in so doing, cannot help but rediscover itself in the discourse of neoliberalism. Springer
subsequently states that he wishes to “contribute to the theorizations that might enable more
forceful critiques of the power of neoliberalism.”20 The Occupy movement for Springer served as
one specific example that pointed toward the inequality inherent in neoliberal practices; the
market influence and corporate favoritism that is often associated with neoliberalism; and the
divisive nature of neoliberal governmental deployment that is characterized by the use violence
to adjust for what it sees as “peacekeeping” against “disobedient adversaries”21.
Neoliberalizations, Springer states, “…exacerbate the concentration of wealth, reshape political
sovereignty, and reorganize economies along increasingly exclusionary lines…”22
The hope is that the exploitative capitalistic underpinning of neoliberalism gives way to
movements in the same vein as Occupy – movements that seek to replace the discourse of
neoliberalism with a new discourse which has, as its primary concern, a more egalitarian social
condition23. Springer explains that social, political, and economic resistance against
neoliberalism is far from being negated in his view but is rather a completely necessary form of
activity. What Occupy did, and what Springer also seeks to do is bring about neoliberal
resistance via alterations in discourse – to challenge “[w]ars, famine, racism, poverty,
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Springer (2012) p. 135
Springer (2010b) p. 549
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Ibid. p. 553
23
Springer (2012) p. 142
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environmental destruction, forced eviction, alienation, social exclusion, homelessness,
inequality, violence, and recurrent economic crises [that] are the footprints of neoliberalism’s
ever more capricious gait…” 24.
While I am sympathetic to Springer’s normative position, I find it to be summarily vague
and consisting of overly broad accusations against a series of practices which we are assuming
constitute neoliberalizations. Further still I believe that while Springer’s goal is a noble one – to
change our sociopolitical world into something of a more radically democratized and egalitarian
project25 – I am not entirely convinced his treatment of neoliberalism is sufficient enough to
provide the means by which we can arrive at such conclusions. Rather, I propose that a firm
investigation into Michel Foucault’s treatment of neoliberalism lends a more helpful take on how
to understand a potential ‘end’ or at least how to best conceive of the sheer scope and power of
whatever postneoliberalism - something ‘beyond’ neoliberalism – is in practice.

Foucault and Neoliberalism
The Foucauldian basis for Springer’s analysis of post/neoliberalism primarily occurs in
Foucault’s lecture series on Biopolitics and Governmentality26. While Foucault himself never
actually uses the word “postneoliberalism” he does introduce a method of understanding
neoliberalism which I believe is remarkably similar to Springer’s assessment of
neoliberalization. What will follow is a brief layout of the similarities I see between Springer’s
discursive neoliberalization and Foucault’s characterization of neoliberalism. I will then discuss
Springer’s portrayal of the dynamic nature of neoliberalism in relation to the Foucauldian
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Springer, (2014) p.12
Springer, (2011)
26
Michel Foucault “Security, Territory, Population” (2007), “The Birth of Biopolitics” (2008)
25

position of expanding govermentality. I contend that the more comprehensive Foucauldian
outlook demonstrates how expansive and dynamic neoliberal practices actually are. This will
lead into my criticism of Springer’s treatment of the ‘end of neoliberalism’, and what I see as
several contradictions in his argument.
In his methodological explication of neoliberalism Foucault, much like Springer,
contended that neoliberalism is not something that should be approached with regards to notions
of beginnings and endings. Therefore, building off scholars such as McNay (2009)27 and
Erlenbusch (2013)28, it is a mistake to conceive of neoliberalism absent its relation liberalism29.
Not because of any inherent distinctions in the outcomes of their respective governmental
practices or to pose the former as the specific origin of the latter, but rather to draw attention to
how practices are deployed in reaction to shifts in the structure of governmentality30. What alters
this deployment of governmental practices and thereby serves as the caesura between liberalism
and neoliberalism is a respite in the adoption of certain truths within governmental institutions;
truths that were characterized by notably socialist and Keynesian policies. It was from this
respite that central veridical claims of liberalism reemerged within the jurisdiction of politicoeconomic practices under the name of neoliberalism. This reinstated variation of liberalism was
one which could now compensate for the issues inherent in centralizing governmental practices
around juridical and sovereign power that had led interventionist episodes in the forms of
Keynesian policies in the US and Nazism in Germany31. Neoliberal governmentality was the
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Mcnay, L. "Self as Enterprise: Dilemmas of Control and Resistance in Foucault's The Birth of Biopolitics." (2009)
p. 57-63
28
Erlenbusch, Verena. "The Place of Sovereignty." (2013) p. 60-61
29
Foucault, Michel “The Birth of Biopolitics” (2008) p. 25-48; 150-172 – much of Foucault’s treatment of liberalism
is scattered throughout the book, but discussions of liberalism are clearly visible in his set up to German
ordoliberalism and the American build-up to Keynesian economics and subsequent shift to neoliberalism.
30
Oksala, Johanna “Violence and Neoliberal Governmentality” (2011) p. 476-477
31
Foucault (2008) p. 189-193

reaction of shifting the juridical framework of the state to a secondary, yet still necessary role
which would be informed by economic reason. Liberalism-in-reaction qua neoliberalism
rendered the original liberal legalistic framework subject to economic indicators and market
competition32.
Subsequently the central features of liberalism manifest as neoliberalism are, at least in
Foucault’s terminology, similar to Springer’s characterization of neoliberalizations – they are
multifaceted, dynamic, and mobile but features that can still be assessed as a sort of interplay
between processes and institutions. For Foucault a study of neoliberal governmentality meets the
same criteria by which one can analyze penal institutions or psychiatric hospitals – that is to say
that the study should seek to understand the jurisdiction of the practices and the site of
veridiction by which those practices operationalize and elucidate what is conditionally true33.
Johanna Oksala in speaking of Foucault clarifies what I believe is a good approach to
neoliberalism’s jurisdiction: “The aim of neoliberal governmentality is to create social conditions
that not only encourage and necessitate natural competitiveness and self-interest, but that
produce them.”34 It does not seem problematic to map this aim onto Springer’s fluid concept of
neoliberalization as practice. In addition, I do not believe this notion of jurisdiction undermines
Springer’s point to avoid treating neoliberalism as monolithic – jurisdiction is the lacuna in
which social objectives themselves can manifest rather than assigning static objectives and ends
to neoliberalism as a universalized concept.
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Ibid p. 293-297; Terranova (2009) p. 237-239
Foucault (2008) p. 32-36
34
Nilsson, Jakob, Sven-Olov Wallenstein Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality. Huddinge: Södertörn U,
(2013). p. 58 - Specifically see, Johanna Oksala's contributed piece "Neoliberalism and Biopolitical
Governmentality" p. 53-73
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As far as a Foucauldian understanding of veridiction is concerned; there is nothing at
odds with Springer’s concern for neoliberalism as monolithism – in fact Springer’s
characterization of neoliberalism looks quite strong here. Veridiction is to be found within
market relations (Terranova, 2009; Oksala 2013) – or rather: the principals of the market “mark
out” a reality35 in which we can verify or falsify certain knowledges behind practices and, in
doing so, allow us to justify aims and functions (jurisdiction) with what can be verified as true36.
This understanding of the market as the site of veridiction is exactly the type of adaptability that
Springer observers in his analysis of neoliberalism. There is no one specific market crises which
can befall a dynamic rendition of neoliberalism that sees the cyclical movement of the market
itself as the instrument of truth. Crises – perhaps better described as unpredictable social,
political, and economic fluctuations -, as Springer notes37 in accordance with Foucault38, sit at
the very basis of the context in which of neoliberal governmentality has developed.
If we are to consider neoliberalism as having its foundations in crisis, than Springer’s
assessment of postneoliberalism’s shortcomings has quite a bit in common with Foucault’s
explication of the nigh-inescapable power of neoliberalism. Indeed, I believe that this contention
of neoliberalism as crises is not altogether inaccurate – the difficultly, however, arises from
Springer’s lack of consideration as to the sheer force that such an analysis carries with it.
Postneoliberal scholarship has struggled, in Springer’s estimate, because it has focused on a
conception of neoliberalism as a monolithic and static entity, but I believe that Springer does not

For a more detailed note on the Foucauldian ontology of governmental regimes of truth “marking reality” see
Foucault (2007) p. 46-49; 108.
36
Foucault (2008) p. 53 Presented as one of the formative aspects of liberalism, p. 240 as American neoliberalism’s
tendency to appropriate economic truths derived from the market to non-market areas.
37
Springer (2014) p. 7
38
Foucault (2007) p. 37; (2008) p. 195-197, 216
35

push this point hard enough. For Foucault, neoliberalism’s jurisdiction is constantly expanding
and shifting; finding new areas of reality to demarcate via economic rationality which can be
carried forward into new, aleatory “non-rational conducts” and areas outside of market
analysis39.
To be blunt: if Foucault’s treatment of neoliberalism’s power in terms of veridiction and
jurisdiction meshes with Springer’s – and I believe it does – then neoliberalism cannot be
challenged by merely expanding its conceptualization into a form of discourse. This is a
categorical mistake – this is the deployment of neoliberalism into a new realm of discussion. A
discursive expansion is just that - an expansion of the scope of jurisdiction that adds to strength
of neoliberalism; Springer has done less to assess the potential end of neoliberalism and instead
furthered its potential ends as a field of discourse. In transforming neoliberalism into the verb
form “neoliberalization” Springer allows, in Foucauldian terms, for an increasingly possible
expansion into non-economic processes, relations, practices, behaviors, and domains by way of
economic analysis40. Springer’s argument against postneoliberalism and intertwined analysis of
neoliberalism does little else than expand neoliberal veridical criteria into the realm of possible
emancipatory discourse. His argument carries neoliberalism beyond a previous version of itself exactly as we saw Springer observe above in his address of the false dichotomy between
postneoliberalism and neoliberalism. The problem then lies in his conclusion that “neoliberalism
may be essentially dead [additional emphasis added] as an intellectual product…” - since in
appropriating new dynamic areas to study neoliberalism as discourse Springer has either fed his
theoretical “zombie” or revived it41.
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Foucault (2008) p. 269-270
Ibid. p. 243
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Springer (2014) p. 12
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As briefly mentioned above there is also the concern of Springer’s normative critique of
what is at stake in an emancipation from neoliberalism. What made the question of
postneoliberalism so problematic for Springer was that such a notion, as it was approached in
scholarship, missed the mark and thus failed to move us any closer to the scholars’ intended
sense of emancipation from neoliberal practices. Here “emancipation” is understood as a
“perpetual contestation of the alienating effects of contemporary neoliberalization.”42 As we
have already seen these alienating effects are wide spread, vague, and subsequently capable of
being applied to any governmentality or historical regime of power rather than solely
neoliberalism. For this very reason I propose that Springer’s argument against a conception of
neoliberalism as monolithic can be turned against his normative theory. Springer’s normative
position views neoliberalism as a universalized, hegemonic force which, somehow - despite its
dynamic characterization - creates curiously discreet and static effects (and a seemingly large
number of them at that). In fact, it seems reasonable to conclude that given the sheer range of
Springer’s potential alienating effects of neoliberalism; we are left with a type of monolithic
normative conception of neoliberalism that functions as little more than a grand source of all
great political, social, and economic ills and inequalities we can identify.

Conclusion
As unsatisfying as it may be, the objective of this paper was not to serve as a bastion of
hope for a possible recapitulation of postneoliberal theory; or even offer a new method of
emancipation from and beyond neoliberalism. Instead the goal has been fairly modest. I have
sought to break down Springer’s argument regarding neoliberalism and its potential end both in
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Springer (2011) p. 525

terms of his analysis and normative discussion. I contended that Foucault offers a stronger
analysis of neoliberalism; by that I mean its strength is underestimated by Springer. While I do
not disagree with Springer in the areas of methodology and find large portions of his analysis in
complete compatibility with a Foucauldian study of neoliberalism, I believe that Springer’s
argument falls short in three interconnected ways. (1) he fell short of pushing the claim of
‘neoliberalism beyond itself’ to its maximum (and possibly optimal) extent and thus did not
grasp its power to mutate, adapt, and account for alterations; because of this (2) he has failed to
evaluate his method in terms of a Foucauldian understanding of neoliberal veridiction and
jurisdiction which, correspondingly, renders said method as another just form of
neoliberalization, and finally (3) his normative critique of neoliberalism as postneoliberalism
results in the creation of the exact type of monolithic and static conception he sought to avoid.
While an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, I would briefly like to
observe a subversive strength in Springer’s argument. I believe that Springer distinguishes
himself from the rest of postneoliberal or emancipatory scholarship by attempting to approach
neoliberalism ‘internally’. Carl Death (2010) suggests that “counter-conducts43… bring new
visibilities, knowledges, techniques, and identities into being while reinforcing existing practices
and mentalities of government.”44 I believe that Springer, is attempting to offer a position that
loosely resembles a counter-conduct. This form of internal debate about neoliberalism may
indeed strengthen neoliberalism in broader non-economic areas, but at the same time might
internally promote a discussion that alters how neoliberal governmentality conceives of the
conduct of individuals45. Internal approaches can potentially strengthen and coax the practices of
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Foucault (2007) p. 196-202. Counter-conducts are, roughly speaking, a Foucauldian type of internal resistance
Death, Carl. "Counter-conducts: A Foucauldian Analytics of Protest." (2010) p. 236
45
Davidson, Arnold I. “In Praise of Counter Conducts” (2011), p. 26-29
44

neoliberalism into new discursive conceptions of areas Springer finds normatively valuable:
namely greater levels of equality and less alienating socioeconomic conditions. This area of
counter-conducts has only recently come to the forefront of scholarship on Foucauldian
resistance (Cadman 2009, Davidson 2011, Ball & Olimedo 2012) and hopefully we will see
expanded study on its connection with neoliberal emancipation in time.
While neoliberalism may not collapse due to a sudden crises or redaction of some
specific set of policies, it seems – on Springer’s account - it can be blamed for nearly any social
ill we can conceive and thus serve as an endless excuse for resistances from any angle. I agree
with Carl Death’s brief assessment of Foucault on the matter:
we need to escape the dilemma of being either for or against. One can, after
all, be face to face, and upright. Working with a government doesn’t imply
either a subjection or a blanket acceptance. One can work with and be
intransigent at the same time. I would even say that the two things go
together.46
Neoliberalism itself is a set of practices; those practices shift and mutate in direct
proportion to the various relations between individuals, institutions, and market conditions. As
such, I think a Foucauldian account gives us an ideation of neoliberalism that not only supplants
the common monolithic variety that Springer is concerned about, but goes one step further than
Springer’s own supposedly non-monolithic rendition. The mere possibility for emancipation, in
so far as there is something like it in terms of neoliberal governmentality, can only exist if we
take to studying neoliberalism in terms of its sheer complexity, reach, and influence. Foucault
did not underestimate neoliberalism, but rather sought to analyze its expansive jurisdiction and

46

This selected quote from Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Vol, 3 was found in Death (2010) p. 249

veridiction; in agreement with Springer I believe we should not try to rush into a discussion of
postneoliberalism but rather, at least for now, seek to continue and deepen the Foucauldian
project of analysis.
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